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How Would Cap-and-Trade Policy Affect Agricultural Producers in North Dakota?  An 
Economic Analysis 




The purpose of this study is to examine the possible impacts of cap-and-trade climate 
policy on agricultural producers in North Dakota.  In this study, we focused on carbon 
sequestration potential and production cost impacts of carbon prices, and explicitly considered 
farmer preferences and adaptation behavior to estimate the benefits and costs of greenhouse gas 
cap-and-trade.  Based on empirically estimated farmer behavior models, a policy simulation with 
agricultural census data identified farmer acreage allocation for carbon sequestration, carbon 
offset supplies and revenues, the production cost impacts of carbon prices, and impacts on net 
farm income and their distributions among heterogeneous farmers.  Our analysis found that: 1) 
farmer ex ante preferences in general were biased against carbon sequestration participation 
although farmer involvement increased with carbon prices; 2) with the fertilizer industry 
exempted from cap-and-trade regulation, the production cost impact would be small, and more 
than half of the farms would gain with a carbon price possibly greater than $10 per metric ton of 
carbon; and 3) the production cost impact with a caped fertilizer industry would be 2 times 
higher, and more than half of the farms or farmland would lose unless the carbon price could 
reach more than $55 per metric ton of carbon.   
 





Many factors can affect farmer decision on participating in carbon credit programs.  
Farmers generally are reluctant to enroll land in carbon credit programs with a 5-year contract.  
Available carbon prices could increase the odds of farmer participation, but their effect is small.  
If a farmer has land in CRP, manages rangeland, owns cropland, is less than 45 years old, is 
concerned about climate change, or supports climate policy, he is more likely to participate in 
carbon credit programs.   
 
For ND, the total acreage enrolled in carbon credit programs was estimated at about 8.5-
22.4 million acres for a carbon price of $5-70 per metric ton of carbon.  Conservation tillage and 
tree planting would be the major possible source of ND supply of carbon offsets with their 
contributions at 46-51% and 31-34%, respectively, depending on the carbon price.  Rangeland 
management would also deserve consideration due to its significant amount of land potentially 
available for providing carbon credits. 
 
Energy prices are highly correlated with agricultural production costs.  Historical 
observations find that variation in energy prices accounts for 91% of the variation in variable 
production costs in North Dakota.  The relationship between variable production costs and 
energy prices are nonlinear and vary between crude oil and natural gas.  
 
The impact of carbon prices on production costs via energy prices depends on specific 
regulation on GHG emissions from the fertilizer industry.  If the fertilizer industry is exempted 
from cap-and-trade regulation, the production cost impact will come largely from the 
consumption of crude oil, with an estimated cost increase ranging from $0.54 to $7.62 per acre 
(or a 0.69- 9.69% increase relative to the variable production cost per unit land in 2009) for a 
carbon price between $5 and $7 per metric ton.  If the fertilizer industry is not exempted from 
cap-and-trade, the production cost impact will be 2 time higher.  
 
At the state aggregate level, if the fertilizer industry is not exempted from cap-and-trade, 
the production cost will exceed the carbon revenue from farmer participation in carbon 
sequestration unless the carbon price is greater than $55 per metric ton of carbon.  If the fertilizer 
industry is exempted from cap-and-trade, the carbon revenue is sufficient enough to offset the 
increase in production costs for any carbon prices greater than $10 per metric ton of carbon.  
These estimates may vary depending on the base year selected as the comparison benchmark. 
 
At the disaggregate farm level, if the fertilizer industry is not exempted from cap-and-
trade, about 73% of ND farms will incur a loss if the carbon price is $5 per metric ton.  This 
percentage will reduce to 41% for a carbon price of $65 per metric ton.  If the fertilizer industry 
is exempted from cap-and-trade, 69% of ND farms will be negatively affected for a carbon price 
of $5 per metric ton.  For a high carbon price of up to $65 per metric ton, only 15% of farms will 
suffer a loss.  More active involvement in carbon sequestration may lower the negative impact of 
cap-and-trade climate policy on farm income. 1 
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  In June 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill titled The American Clean 
Energy and Security Act (HR 2454) which is also known as the Waxman-Markey climate bill.  
Intended to achieve the U.S. goal in energy security and climate change adaption, this bill 
proposed a cap-and trade (CAT) program to curb and reduce U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions while promoting improvement of energy efficiency and development of renewable 
energy.  As an economy-wide CAT program on GHG emissions would impose a carbon cost on 
any economic activities that release carbon, the CAT climate legislation could affect many 
sectors in the U.S. economy.  
 
To the U.S. agricultural sector, the impact of GHG CAT is subject to debate with 
different views.  As CAT would increase the prices for energy and energy-intensive agricultural 
inputs such as fertilizer, there are concerns that agriculture would suffer from increased 
production costs (Francl et al. 1998, Doane Advisory Services 2008).  Many resource 
economists, however, appear more optimistic and believe that a CAT climate policy could bring 
many benefits, including on-farm carbon sequestration, increased demand for bio-energy 
feedstocks from agriculture, and higher commodity prices due to land competition, such that the 
potential revenue may be sufficient enough to more than offset the increase in production costs 
(Babcock 2009, McCarl 2009, Murray et al. 2009, Baker et al. 2010).    
 
While the current debate on the agricultural impact of CAT reflects varying focus on the 
potential benefits and costs, different assumptions on farmer behavior and policy design affect 
estimation of those benefits and costs that may lead to different conclusions on the policy impact.  
On the cost side, as agriculture is likely to be exempted from GHG emission regulation in any 
final legislation, the most direct agricultural impact boils down to production cost increases due 
to rising input prices to cover carbon costs.  With changing and increasing prices for energy and 
energy-related inputs, would farmers be indifferent and still follow the same production practices 
as before the price change without changing their consumption of inputs? If farmers are to 
reduce the use of energy and energy-related inputs by production adjustment, they will 
effectively mitigate the cost impact of carbon prices.  On the benefit side, if agriculture is 
allowed to provide carbon emission offsets in the carbon market, then the direct agricultural 
impact of CAT includes on-farm carbon sequestration potential in addition to the market effects 
of CAT-induced demand expansion for agriculture-based bio-energy feedstocks and higher 
commodity prices.  Similarly, farmer responses to the opportunities brought by a federal CAT 
program and their market consequence can affect estimation of the potential benefits.   
 
This study attempts to develop an economic analysis on some of the possible local 
impacts of a CAT climate policy on local agricultural producers in North Dakota (ND).  In this 
study, we consider a CAT climate policy that exempts agriculture from GHG emission regulation 
and that allows agriculture to provide carbon emission offsets in a carbon market.  This study is 
focused on two direct impacts on net farm income: potential revenue from carbon sequestration 2 
 
participation and rising production costs due to societal carbon regulation.  We assume that 
farmers incur no additional costs for participating in carbon sequestration programs.  Explicitly 
considering farmer behavior with respect to carbon sequestration potential and production cost 
management, this study intends to address four policy-relevant questions, including: 1) how 
farmer would respond to on-farm carbon sequestration, 2) what would be the production cost 
impact with farm ability of adaptation, 3) to what extent the potential revenue from carbon 
sequestration participation could offset the increase in production costs so as to increase farm 
income, and 4) how the CAT impact would be distributed among heterogeneous farmers.           
      
Farmer Preferences and Adaptation 
 
To estimate the impact of CAT on agricultural producers, the key is to understand farmer 
behavior under expected changes in economic and market conditions.  Under CAT, one 
important opportunity for farmers is the potential to sequester carbon on farm by adjusting 
production practices and sell carbon emission offsets in the market.  Yet, on-farm carbon 
sequestration is a new concept in which farmers have no experience.  Farmers may be risk-averse 
and may not be fully responsive to new market opportunities like carbon sequestration, which 
requires certain production practices with a commitment of at least 5 years.  How likely farmers 
would participate in carbon sequestration will affect how much benefit farmers could derive 
from CAT while subject to production cost increase.      
 
Farmer behavior in production cost management is equally important as well.  Farmers 
are responsive and can adapt to mitigate the negative impact of policy that affects their 
production costs or revenue.  When CAT increases prices for energy and energy-related inputs, 
profit-maximizing farmers will adjust their production to reduce consumption of these inputs 
substituted by other inputs with relatively lower prices.  Farmer adaptation in production cost 
management will mitigate the cost impact of carbon prices although increased production costs 
may still be expected resulting from CAT.     
 
A third challenge for analyzing the local impacts of CAT is the heterogeneity among 
farmers.  U.S. agriculture is characterized by high heterogeneity.  As not all farmers are the same 
in terms of their farming attributes, it is likely that some farmers would gain while others would 
lose.  While an estimate of the aggregate impact of CAT provides useful information on the 
economic efficiency of the policy, decision-makers are also concerned with how the impact of 
CAT is possibly distributed and what would be the magnitudes of economic gains or losses for 
individual farmers.  Given the larger number of farmers with high heterogeneity, estimating the 
welfare effect of CAT has never been easy and can only be done by statistically simulation with 
approximation since modeling hundreds of thousands of farmer individually is impossible. 
 
In this study, we conducted a mailing survey to elicit farmer preferences to carbon 
sequestration.  We use farmer stated preferences to calibrate a farmer behavior function that can 
predict the probabilities that farmers with given attributes would enroll land in carbon 
sequestration with different carbon prices.  We draw on economic theory to specify farm 





prices to capture farmer adaptation to manage production costs with changing energy prices.  We 
apply the estimated farmer behavior models to agriculture census data to simulate acreage 
enrollment in carbon sequestration, carbon supply and revenue, production cost impacts, and 
more importantly, the impact on net farm income and its distributions for ND farms.    
 
Farmer Preference Survey and Data 
 
The survey questionnaire is composed of three sections.  Section 1 is intended to elicit farmer 
willingness to enroll in carbon sequestration programs.  Table 1 lists the carbon sequestration 
programs included in the survey.  Section 2 is designed with questions to collect information on 
farmer social economic background and their attitudes to climate change and legislation.  In 
section 3, questions are raised on farmer current production practice.  Data collected by sections 
2 and 3 are intended to be used as surrogates to measure farmer perceived costs for sequestering 
carbon on their land.   
 
Table 1.  Example of carbon sequestration programs included in survey questionnaire
a 
Carbon credit program
b  Available carbon credits
  Market return rate 




c  0.4 metric ton/acre/year  $10/acre/year 
Cropland conversion to grass  1.0 metric ton/acre/year  $25/acre/year 
Rangeland management  0.12 metric ton/acre/year  $3/acre/year 
Tree planting
d  0.7-1.8 metric ton/acre/year
e  $17.5-45/acre/year 
Methane management   21 metric ton/metric ton 
methane/year 
$525/metric ton methane/year 
a.  Carbon credit programs are adopted from the voluntary programs managed by the NFU 
(2009) 
b.  All programs require at least 5 year commitment. 
c.  Including planting methods commonly referred to as: no till, strip till, direct seed, zero till, 
slot till, and zone till.   
d.  Tree planting may require a contract longer than 5 years. 
e.  Depending on tree age and species; at least 20 acres enrollment required. 
f.  Assume a carbon price of $25/metric ton.  
 
  The survey was administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) field office in ND.  We designed six different versions of 
survey questionnaire to incorporate different levels of the carbon price ranging from $5/metric 
ton to $70/metric ton.  For each version of the questionnaire, a sample of 500 farmers across ND 
was randomly selected from the USDA NASS database.  The survey questionnaires were mailed 
out on January 15, 2010, followed by a postcard reminder after two weeks.  A total of 316 survey 
questionnaires were returned.  Among those returned questionnaire, 35 are not filled out and the 







Table 2.  Summary of survey responses 
Attribute  Level  Percentage 
Assigned carbon price  














Carbon program enrollment 
 
Currently enrolled 
Not enrolled but willing to enroll 
7% 
46% 
Farm region  
 
North Central 
West Missouri Slope 
South Central 







45 years old 
46-60 years old 












Major source of household 
Income 
Farming  60% 
Education 
 
High school or less 
Technical training beyond high school 
4 year college or some college 





Attitude to climate change 
and legislation 
Concerned about climate change 
Support climate legislation 
44% 
18% 













no till or potential 
CRP 


























































































































Variable Production Cost, $/acre
Natural Gas Price, $/10000 cubic meter
Crude Oil Price, $/bbl
Other data needed for this study include production costs, total acreages of planted 
cropland and rangeland, and energy prices to estimate the production cost function.  Although 
county level data are desirable, they are not available.  Instead, we collected state-level annual 
variable cash expenses and acreages of production farmland over the period of 1968-2008 from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA 2010a).   
 
We collected prices for two major energy sources – natural gas and crude oil – that are 
directly or indirectly consumed in agricultural production.  Natural gas accounts for the majority 
of the production cost of fertilizers, which is an important input for agriculture.  Crude oil is the 
raw material for diesel and gasoline, which are directly consumed in agricultural production 
operations.  Natural gas prices are nominal prices for industrial sector.  Crude oil prices are 
combined nominal refiner acquisition costs of domestic and imported crude oil.  All energy 
prices are annual averages for the period of 1968-2008 from the U.S. Department of Energy 
Information Administration (EIA 2010).  Figure 1 depicts the variable production costs and the 
energy prices.  As shown in the figure, production costs are highly correlated with natural gas 
























            Data Source: energy prices from EIA (2010), production costs from USDA (2010a)  
Figure 1.  Historical observations of annual averages of energy prices and variable 
production cost for per unit land in ND. 








Farmer choice on carbon sequestration participation 
We use the discrete choice method to model farmer choice on carbon sequestration 
participation.  Table 3 defines independent variables used in farmer choice modeling.  Table 4 
presents the results of our econometric modeling, including estimates of elasticity of the 
likelihood that farmers would enroll land in carbon sequestration programs with respect to 
different factors.  As demonstrated by Table 4, the binary logit model fits farmer choices 
reasonably well and it predicts 75% of the farmer choices in the survey sample.  
 
Table 3.  Definition of independent variables  
Independent Variable  Definition 
EnrollDummy  Choice specific dummy, 1 indicating carbon program enrollment and 0 
otherwise 
Price  Specified market price for per metric ton of sequestered carbon 
Farming  Land use dummy, 1 denoting land in crop farming and 0 otherwise  
Rangeland  Land use dummy, 1 denoting rangeland management and 0 otherwise 
CRP  Land use dummy, 1 denoting CRP land and 0 otherwise 
NW  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the northwest region of ND and 0 otherwise 
NC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the north central region of ND and 0 
otherwise  
NE  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the northeast region of ND and 0 otherwise 
WC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the west central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
CT  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the central region of ND and 0 otherwise 
EC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the east central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
SW  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the southwest region of ND and 0 otherwise 
SC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the south central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
SE  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the southeast region of ND and 0 otherwise 
Ownland  Land tenure dummy, 1 denoting owning farmland and 0 otherwise  
Rentland  Land tenure dummy, 1 denoting renting farmland and 0 otherwise 
Agel45  Age group dummy, 1 denoting the group of 45 years old or younger and 0 
otherwise 
Age4659  Age group dummy, 1 denoting the group of 46 to 59 years old and 0 otherwise 
Ageg60  Age group dummy, 1 denoting the group of over 60 years old and 0 otherwise 
FExpl10  Farming experience dummy, 1 denoting less than 10 years of experience and 0 
otherwise 
FExp11-19  Farming experience dummy, 1 denoting 11 to 19 years of experience and 0 
otherwise 
FExpg20  Farming experience dummy, 1 denoting 20 or more years of experience and 0 
otherwise 
ClimA  Farmer attitude dummy, 1 denoting being concerned about climate change and 
0 otherwise 
ClimAP   Farmer attitude dummy, 1 denoting supporting climate legislation and 0 
otherwise 
   7 
 
Table 4.  Estimated coefficient parameters of the binary logit model of farmer choice to 
participate in carbon sequestration and estimated elasticities of carbon sequestration 
probability with respect to farmer attributes.   
Independent Variable  Estimated Coefficient   Standard Error  Choice Elasticity
a  
EnrollDummy  -4.8371
***  0.9673   
Price                0.0329
***  0.0087  0.5381
*** 
Farming                0.5386  0.4278         0.2538 
CRP                1.1145
***  0.3741  0.5103
*** 
Rangeland                1.2091
***  0.3664  0.5562
*** 
NW                0.2307  0.6290         0.1083 
NC               -1.4858
**  0.7084        -0.6367
** 
NE               -0.3916  0.6349        -0.1850 
WC                0.8428
  0.7508         0.3735
 
EC                0.0315  0.6893         0.0149 
SW               -0.0654   0.6856        -0.0309 
SC                0.7058  0.6855         0.3196 
SE               -0.8671   0.6358        -0.4007 
Ownland                1.5954
***  0.6609         0.6779
*** 
Rentland              -0.7575
**  0.4113        -0.3513
** 
Agel45                1.3405
***  0.5428  0.5784
*** 
Ageg60              -0.2815  0.3784        -0.1331 
FExpg20                0.9280
**  0.4712         0.4306
** 
ClimA                0.8139
**  0.3675         0.3783
** 
ClimAP                 0.8038




            -121.066 
75% 
   
Note: *** denotes significance level at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1 
a.  For dummy variables, the elasticity estimates were calculated as: 
0 0 1 Pr / ) Pr (Pr  
where Pr1 is the probability estimated with the focal variable being 1 and all other 
variables at their sample means; and Pr0 is the probability estimated with the focal 
variable being 0 and all other variables at their sample means.  For carbon price, the 
elasticity estimate was calculated as:  
100 /
/ 1





where Pr1 is the probability estimated with the carbon price being 1 plus its sample mean 
and all other variables at their sample means; and Pr0 is the probability estimated with all  
variables at their sample means. 
 
  Many factors can affect farmer choice regarding carbon sequestration participation.  As 
expected, available carbon prices could significantly increase the odds of farmer involvement in 
carbon sequestration.  Farmer current land use practices, land tenure, ages, and attitudes toward 
climate change and legislation could also affect the probability of carbon program participation.  
Specifically, if a farmer has land in CRP, manages rangeland, owns cropland, is less than 45 
years old, is concerned about climate change, or supports climate policy, the farmer is more 
likely to participate in carbon sequestration.    8 
 
Interestingly, farmers in general are biased against participating in carbon programs as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient for the dummy variable denoting carbon 
program enrollment.  From the perspective of farmer profit-maximizing behavior, the negative 
coefficient means a threshold level of private costs perceived by farmers for enrolling in carbon 
programs.  This private cost threshold may be attributed to farmer perceptions of uncertainties 
associated with program enrollment or simply the loss of flexibility in land use and management 
with a 5 year commitment once enrolled in the carbon program.     
 
To understand the effects of different factors, Table 4 also reports in the fourth column 
the elasticities of the probability of farmer enrollment in carbon programs.  Specifically, 
ownership of cropland has the strongest effect that increases the probability of carbon program 
participation by approximately 68%.  The effects of farmer age, engagement in rangeland 
management and CRP, farming experience, and farmer attitude to climate change are also sizable 
that increase the probability of carbon program participation by 58%, 56%, 51%, 43%, and 37%, 
respectively.  As to the effect of carbon prices, Table 4 shows that the probability of carbon 
program enrollment on average would increase 0.54% for a 1% increase in the carbon price at 
$34/metric ton.   
 
Farmer production costs with respect to energy prices   
Our empirical estimation of farmer production cost function reveals a quadratic 
relationship between variable production costs and energy prices on a per acre basis.  As 
demonstrated by Table 5, all the estimated coefficients for the independent variables are 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The adjusted R-square statistic indicates that variation in energy 
prices can account for up to 91% of the variation in variable production costs for the considered 
time period.  Table 5 suggests different marginal cost effects between energy sources: for natural 
gas, it is positive and decreasing; for crude oil, it is negative and increasing.   
 
Table 5.  Estimated production cost function for per unit farmland for ND  
Independent variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
Intercept                     11.0934
***  3.5023 
Natural gas price                     21.9175
***  3.2773 
Natural gas price square                      -1.2955
***  0.3323 
Crude oil price                      -1.3347
***  0.4405 
Crude oil price square                       0.0191
***  0.0042 
Adjusted R square                       0.91   
Note: *** denotes significance level at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1 
 
The estimated production cost function has important implications on farmer 
vulnerability or ability to adapt to the price impacts of different energy sources.  When crude oil 
prices are low, agricultural consumption of crude oil may be extensive with low energy 
efficiency.  Consequently, when crude oil prices rise, farmers may be able to easily cut crude oil 
consumption by improving energy efficiency so as to mitigate the production cost impact.  
However, farmer ability to mitigate the cost impact of energy prices appears not as strong for 
natural gas as for crude oil.  Farmers will see increased production costs with rising natural gas  
prices.  It is worth noting that, with a quadratic production cost function, the marginal cost 
impact of energy prices depends on the level of energy prices in the base year.  In this study, the 




We apply the estimated farmer behavior models to agricultural census data to simulate farmer 
acreage enrollment in carbon sequestration, carbon supply and revenue, production cost impacts 
with farmer adaptation, and impacts on ND farm income for different carbon prices.  Table 6 
presents the 2007 agricultural census data for ND used in the simulation.     
 
Table 6.  Summary of 2007 ND agricultural census data used in policy simulation  
Agricultural attributes  Number of farms  Total acreage 
    Farms  31,970  37,830,203
a 
Land use and management     
    Harvested cropland  20,408  22,035,717 
    Cropland only used for pasture or grazing   4,025  812,553 
    Cropland failed or abandoned  2,855  530,496 
    Cropland in cultivated summer fallow  3,443  598,516 
    Permanent pasture and rangeland  14,964  10,418,885 
    Land in conservation   15,253  3,434,036 
Land tenure     
    Own land  29,099  19,977,605 
    Rent land  15,667  19,696,981 
Principle operator age group     
    Less than 45 years    6,376  NA 
    45 to 59 years  12,707  NA 
    60 years and over  12,887  NA 
Data source: USDA (2010b) 
a.  Only include the land in the listed land use and management, which accounts for 95% of 
the total farmland in ND. 
Acreage enrollment in carbon sequestration and carbon supply 
Table 7 presents simulation results on farmer acreage enrollment in carbon credit 
programs for ND.  As expected, the acreage of farmland enrolled in carbon credit programs 
increases with carbon prices.  The total acreage in carbon programs expands from around 8.5 
million to 22.4 million when the carbon price rises from $5 to $70 per metric ton of carbon.  The 
contributions to the total acreage are uneven across carbon programs and vary depending on the 
carbon price.  Conservation tillage constitutes nearly half of the acreage in carbon sequestration, 
and its contribution increases from 45% to 52%.  Although accounting for around 42% of the 
acreage in carbon sequestration for a carbon price of $5/metric ton, rangeland management 
contributes less than conservation tillage with a decreasing share as the carbon price increases.  
Cropland conversion to grass accounts for a small share of 2-3% of the enrolled farmland and its 
contribution goes up for a high carbon price.  Farmland enrolled in tree planting makes up 
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  Table 8 presents the amounts of carbon sequestered for different carbon prices.  The total 
amount of carbon sequestered increases from around 3.3 million metric ton to 9.1 million metric 
ton as the carbon price rises from $5 to $70 per metric ton of carbon.  The share of the 
contribution from each program varies.  Conservation tillage still is the major source for 
sequestered carbon with its share ranging from 46% to 51%, which is consistent with their 
acreage contribution.  In contrast, rangeland management provides only 10-13% of carbon 
although its acreage contribution accounts for 35-42%.  Tree planting and cropland conversion to 
grass provide, respectively, about 31-34% and 7% of the total sequestered carbon, more than 
their acreage contributions.    
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In all, conservation tillage and tree planting represent the major source of ND supply of 
carbon emission offsets.  Although conservation tillage may not sequester as much carbon as tree 
planting does, it can be applied to harvested cropland - the majority of farmland - without 
incurring significant opportunity costs.  The acreage available for planting tree may be limited 
due to significant conversion costs, uncertainties in carbon markets, or loss of option value.  
However, tree planting appears to be a significant option for carbon sequestration since the large 
amount of carbon can be sequestered in tree.  Both rangeland management and cropland 
conversion to grass deserve consideration by their sizable amounts of carbon sequestration 
potential without incurring significant opportunity costs.    
 
CAT impact on farm income and distributional effect  
Table 9 summarizes the impact of CAT on the production costs for ND farms.  Note that 
the estimates of energy price increase relative to the 2009 level were based on the carbon 
contents of energy sources without considering the market equilibrium effect of carbon prices.  
As the carbon cost for energy consumption is likely to be shared jointly between energy 
producers and consumers, the estimated energy price increase represents an upper bound for the 
price impact of carbon pricing.  However, given that energy consumption is less elastic than 
energy supply, those estimates are likely to be close to those accounting for the market 
equilibrium price effect.    
 




a  Production cost increase, $/acre (%)
b 
Natural gas  Crude oil  Fert. industry exempted  Fert. industry capped 
5  1%  1%  0.54 (0.69)  1.14 (1.45) 
15  4%  3%  1.63 (2.08)  3.43 (4.36) 
25  7%  5%  2.72 (3.46)  5.71 (7.26) 
35  10%  7%  3.81 (4.84)  7.99 (10.17) 
50  14%  10%  5.44 (6.92)  11.42 (14.53) 
70  19%  14%  7.62 (9.69)  15.99 (20.34) 
a.  Energy price increases are relative to the 2009 price levels.  The estimates are based on 
the carbon content of energy sources as if a carbon tax was posed on energy prices 
without considering the market equilibrium effect of carbon pricing. 
b.  The percentage in parenthesis is relative to the 2009 annual average of viable production 
costs for per unit land for ND. 
 
As illustrated by Table 9, carbon prices appear to have a relatively stronger effect on 
natural gas prices than on crude oil prices.  The differential effects between natural gas and crude 
oil tend to be more prominent when the carbon price is higher.  For a carbon price of $5/metric 
ton, prices for natural gas and crude oil both increase 1% relative to their 2009 levels.  However, 
when the carbon price reaches $70/metric ton, the natural gas price will increase 19% while the 
crude oil price will increase 14% relative to their 2009 levels.   
 
Historical observations have revealed that farmers are less able to mitigate the production 
cost impact for a price increase for natural gas as compared to for crude oil.  Farmer vulnerability 
to natural gas prices, combined with the stronger effect of carbon costs on natural gas prices, 





































Carbon Price, $/metric ton carbon
Carbon squestration revenue
Production cost impact 
(fertilizer industry exempted)
Production cost impact 
(fertilizer industry capped)
than for crude oil.  Indeed, our estimates of the production cost impact confirm the reasoning.  
Agricultural consumption of natural gas is indirectly through fertilizer use.  If the fertilizer 
industry is exempted from CAT regulation, the production cost impact will come largely from 
the consumption of crude oil, with an estimated cost increase ranging from $0.54 to $7.62 per 
acre (or a 0.69% to 9.69% increase relative to the variable production cost for per unit land in 
2009) for a carbon price between $5 and $70 per metric ton of carbon.  However, if the fertilizer 
industry is not exempted from CAT, the production cost impact for ND farmers will be 2 times 
higher, with an estimate cost increase ranging between $1.14 and $15.99 per acre (or a 1.45% to 
20.34% increase relative to the variable production costs for per unit land in 2009) for the same 
range of carbon prices.   
        
Figure 2 compares aggregate carbon sequestration revenues and production cost impacts 
for ND farms.  If the fertilizer industry is not exempted from CAT, the production cost impact 
will exceed the carbon revenue unless the carbon price is greater than $55 per metric ton of 
carbon.  As the carbon revenue is not sufficient to offset the increase in production costs for a 
carbon price below $55 per metric ton, ND farms in aggregate would suffer a loss from CAT.  
However, if the fertilizer industry is exempted from CAT, the production cost impact on ND 
farms will be much smaller.  In this case, for any carbon prices greater than $10 per metric ton, 
the carbon revenue is sufficient enough to offset the increase in production costs such that ND 
farms in aggregate would gain from CAT by participating in carbon sequestration.  It is worth 
noting that the production cost impacts were estimated relative to the 2009 ND production costs 
for different carbon prices.  These estimates may vary depending on the base year selected as the 






















Figure 2.  Demonstration of aggregate carbon sequestration revenues and production cost 
impacts to ND farms for different carbon prices.   
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The impact of CAT on individual farms can be different, depending on specific farmer 
attributes including their production practices.  Figure 3 depict the cumulative distributions of net 
farm profits by farms for different carbon prices and CAT regulation on the fertilizer industry.  
One type of information delivered by the cumulative distributions of net farm profits is the 
percentage of farms that would suffer a loss from CAT.  If the fertilizer industry is not exempted 
from CAT, as demonstrated by panel a in Figure 3, around 73% of ND farms will incur a loss if 
the carbon price is $5 per metric ton.  The percentage of farms with a non-positive net profit is 
reduced from 73% to 41% if the carbon price is $65 instead of $5 per metric ton of carbon.  
 
a.  Fertilizer industry capped 




















































  I: Carbon price = $5/metric ton
 II: Carbon price = $25/metric ton
III: Carbon price = $45/metric ton
IV: Carbon price = $65/metric ton14 
 
 
b.  Fertilizer industry exempted 
Figure 3.  Cumulative distributions of marginal farm profits for different carbon prices 
  
If the fertilizer industry is exempted from CAT, panel b in Figure 3 shows the percentage 
of farms that will suffer a loss falls dramatically as compared to panel a for each carbon price.  
For a low carbon price of $5 per metric ton, 69% instead of 73% of ND farms will be negatively 
affected by CAT.  For a high carbon price of up to $65 per metric ton, the percentage of ND 
farms that will see negative net farm profits drops from 41% with a capped fertilizer industry to 
14% if the fertilizer industry is exempted.  Both carbon prices and fertilizer industry regulation 
significantly affect the distributional effect of CAT among heterogeneous farmers.        
  
The cumulative distributions of net farm profits also show the magnitudes of possible 
economic gains or losses to ND farms.  As illustrated by Figures 3, for a carbon price between $5 
and $65 per metric ton of carbon, the economic loss on a per acre basis ranges between $0 and 
$15 with the fertilizer industry capped or between $0 and $8 with the fertilizer industry 
exempted from CAT.  However, the effects of the carbon price are not symmetric between 
economic gains and losses. The economic gain from CAT can increase dramatically as compared 
to the economic loss.  Figures 3 shows that, the economic gain for some farms can reach up to 
$80 per acre for a carbon price of $65 per metric ton, which is in contrast with a maximum 
economic loss of around $15 or $8 per acre depending CAT regulation on the fertilizer industry.  
The asymmetric effects of carbon prices reflect farmer capacity of adaptation to manage 
production costs while benefiting from on-farm carbon sequestration.       
 
Conclusion 
This study is motivated to examine the possible local impacts of CAT climate policy on 
agricultural producers in ND.  It draws on economic theory and the existing literature attempting 
to develop an economically sound analysis of possible CAT impacts, particularly potential 


















































  I: Carbon price = $5/metric ton
 II: Carbon price = $25/metric ton
III: Carbon price = $45/metric ton
IV: Carbon price = $65/metric ton15 
 
revenue from carbon sequestration and the production cost impact of carbon pricing.  It focuses 
on farmer production behavior and explicitly considers farmer preferences to carbon 
sequestration potential, adaptation to manage production costs, and heterogeneity among farms.  
Based on empirically estimated farmer behavior models, a policy simulation with agricultural 
census data provides important implications on agricultural potential to adapt to climate change 
mitigation. 
 
Farmers are reluctant ex ante to participate in carbon sequestration.  With agriculture 
exempted from GHG emission regulation, CAT creates opportunities for farmers to make 
additional income by providing carbon emission offsets.  Based on our survey, however, we 
found that farmers in general had a bias against participating in carbon sequestration.  This may 
be attributed to farmer unfamiliarity with the carbon sequestration concept and perceived high 
private costs of farm management to sequester carbon while maintaining commodity production.  
Indeed, it was quite common that survey respondents expressed their concerns over regulation on 
farm management and loss of control of farmland.  Better education and extension to explain on-
farm carbon sequestration are needed for agriculture to adapt to societal climate change 
mitigation.  Nonetheless, conservation tillage and tree planting appear promising to play a major 
role in the Northern Plains to contribute a large portion of carbon emission offsets without 
incurring significant opportunity costs.   
 
  Farmers have the ability to mitigate the production cost impact of a CAT climate policy.  
Our theory-driven, production cost approach based on historical observations reveal that farmers 
can effectively manage their operation costs to mitigate the impact of energy price increase by 
improving production efficiency.  However, farmer ability of production cost management varies 
among energy sources and the level of energy prices.  From a local perspective, our study 
confirms existing findings that CAT has limited impact on agricultural production costs. With 
their ability to manage production costs, farmers may gain from CAT by optimal farm 
management to produce food while sequestering carbon.  System design and integration are 
needed to reconstruct agricultural production to better adapt to an energy efficient, low carbon 
economy.    
 
    Policy design can affect the agricultural impact of CAT.  While fertilizer costs make up 
an important portion of farmer production costs, a CAT policy with an exempted fertilizer 
industry could dramatically reduce its cost impact on agriculture.  On a per acre basis, the 
production cost impact for ND farms is about 2 times higher with a capped fertilizer industry 
than with an exempted fertilizer industry.  In aggregate, with an exempted fertilizer industry, ex 
ante carbon sequestration revenues would be greater than the production cost impact for a carbon 
price over $10/metric ton for ND farms even if farmers are in general not willing to participate in 
carbon sequestration.  Without the exemption of the fertilizer industry, the carbon price needs to 
reach approximately $55/metric ton for ND farms to break even with ex ante carbon 
sequestration revenues offsetting increased production costs.  A policy design to allow the 
exemption of the fertilizer industry from CAT may help the U.S. agricultural sector adapt to 
government efforts to mitigate climate change.      
  
  The impact of CAT on ND farm income is unevenly distributed.  With the fertilizer 
industry exempted, the CAT impact on production costs would be small.  Most farms in ND 
would gain for a carbon price over $20 per metric ton of carbon even if farmers are reluctant to 16 
 
participate in carbon sequestration.  With the fertilizer industry being capped, the CAT impact on 
production costs would be greater.  Most farms in ND would lose for any carbon prices below 
$50/metric ton.  In both cases, on a per acre basis, the economic losses are limited as compared 
to the economic gains across farms.     
 
  While we strive to develop an economically sound analysis of some of the possible local 
impacts of CAT on agriculture, this study like many others comes with some caveats which arise 
mainly due to our local focus in research scale.  First, in this study, we did not consider two other 
effects that can affect the assessment of GHG CAT.  Some existing studies indicate that CAT 
may have economy-wide market consequences including increased demand for bio-energy 
feedstock and rising prices for agricultural commodities, both of which can increase farm income 
(Schneider and McCarl 2005, Murray et al. 2009).  To quantify these market equilibrium effects, 
an equilibrium analysis is required at the national scale, which is beyond the scope of this study.  
We understand that it is highly challenging to accurately quantify the benefits from both effects 
with complex market dynamics interacting with farmer behavior and US energy and agricultural 
policies, including the indirect land use effect.  Focused on carbon sequestration potential 
without considering the market equilibrium effects, this study likely underestimates the benefit 
that CAT would bring to agriculture.  
 
  Second, it would not be surprising if this study underestimated the agricultural potential 
of carbon sequestration.  The estimation of on-farm carbon sequestration is based on our survey 
of farmer ex ante preferences to carbon sequestration participation.  As mentioned above, the on-
farm carbon sequestration potential is a new concept for which farmers do not have much 
experience.  A risk-averse farmer might overweight the uncertainty and risk for involving in a 
new production option that requires a long-time commitment while subject to regulation.  As a 
result, farmers were less willing to being involved in carbon sequestration, as indicated by the 
survey.  With this recognition, it is also economically reasonable to expect more active farmer 
involvement when the production cost impact becomes a sunk cost with an effective CAT 
climate policy and when farmers become familiar with on-farm management that can produce 
both crop or livestock and carbon offsets.  After all, sequestering carbon does not have to 
compete with crop or livestock production (although they could under high carbon prices) and 
may more than offset the sunk cost of production cost increase under CAT while also bring other 
joint farm benefits such as increased soil fertility.  
 
  Third, this study did not consider the environmental benefits of CAT.  Studies have 
suggested that carbon sequestration can bring many other environmental benefits due to its 
implication on changes in land use and production practices (Elbakidze and McCarl 2007, Feng 
et al. 2007).  These environmental benefits include improved soil fertility and water quality with 
reduced soil erosion and water pollution plus wildlife benefit.  We did not incorporate these 
benefits because this study is from the farmer perspective to maximize farm profits and there is 
no market (except CRP or WRP) that currently exists to reward farmers for providing those 
environmental benefits.  If a market in combination with the carbon market can also be 
established for other environmental credits jointly produced by sequestering carbon, farmers may 
see higher benefits from the CAT program.  
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